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Debate on the Treaty between Great Britain and Ireland, signed in
London on the 6th December 1921: Sessions 14 December 1921 to 10 January 1922:
Author: The Deputies of Dáil Eireann
DÁIL EIREANN PUBLIC SESSION Wednesday, December 14th, 1921
The meeting of Dáil Eireann to deal with the Peace Treaty began in the
Council Chamber, University College, Dublin, on Wednesday, December 14th, 1921.
The Speaker (Dr. Eoin Mac Neill National University and Derry) took the Chair at
11.30 a.m., and immediately opened the proceedings by saying:
SPEAKER
In ainm De, glaodhfaimíd an rolla.
The Clerk to the Dáil, Mr. Diarmuid O hEigceartuigh, called the roll.
PRESIDENT DE VALERA said:
Tá fhios againn go leir ce an fáth go bhfuilimíd anso iniu agus an cheist
mhór atá againn le socrú. Níl mo chuid Gaedhilge chó maith agus ba mhaith liom í
bheith. Is fearr is feidir liom mo smaointe do nochtadh as Beurla, agus dá bhrí
sin is dóich liom gurbh fhearra dhom labhairt as Beurla ar fad. Some of the
members do not know Irish, I think, and consequently what I shall say will be in
English. The question we have to decide is one which ought to be decided on its
merits, and it would be very unfortunate if extraneous matters such as what I
might call an accidental division of opinion of the Cabinet, or the causes which
gave rise to it, should cut across these considerations. I think, therefore, it
would be wise to give a short narrative of the circumstances under which the
plenipotentiaries were appointed, and to explain the terms of reference, if I
might call them so, or directions given to them, and to explain them in so far
as I can do so, consistent with public interest. If anybody wants a mere
detailed explanation, or wants to probe into the difference of opinion more
deeply, we can do so at a private session. We can easily resolve ourselves into
a private session and go fully into the matter. Really there is nothing
extraordinary in the division of opinion, for this reason, that when the
plenipotentiaries would report, it was obvious the Cabinet would have to take a
policy. Either the whole Cabinet would have to go over-if the possibility of
division was to be eliminated, the whole Cabinet should take responsibility for
the negotiations, which was a thing that would not be desirable for other
reasons. Even if they did there might be divisions. You could scarcely eliminate
differences of opinion. It was necessary then either that the plenipotentiaries
should be a whole Cabinet or that there should be other persons than members of
the Cabinet. What we did was, we selected three members of the Cabinet with two
others and it was obvious if these plenipotentiaries were to be in a position to
do the work given to them they should have full powers of negotiation. At the
two meetings of the Dáil at which they were appointed I made it quite clear that
my own point of view, and the point of view of the Cabinet as a whole - at least
I took responsibility for saying it was the view of the Cabinet- was that the
plenipotentiaries should have full plenary powers to negotiate, with the
understanding, however, that when they reported, the Cabinet would decide its
policy, and whatever arrangement they arrived at, it would have to be submitted
to the Dáil for ratification. The question of committing the country completely
without ratification by the Dáil was of course out of the question. This
assembly would not have sent any five men to negotiate a treaty which would bind
the nation without some chance of a larger body of representatives of the nation
having an opportunity of criticising and reviewing it, and, I would say under
the circumstances, of the nation itself reviewing it. Now, that was quite a
common sense understanding. They had to have the plenary powers in order to be
able to do their work. If there was a definite difference of opinion, it was the
plenipotentiaries had the responsibility of making up their own minds and
deciding on it. we had ourselves the right of refusing to agree with them, if we
thought that was right. It was also obvious that the Cabinet and the
plenipotentiaries should keep in the closest possible touch. We did that. We
were in agreement up to a certain point. A definite question had then to be
decided and we did not agree. I do not know if the Chairman of the Delegation or
the plenipotentiaries would have any objection---it would not in any way
interfere with public interests---if the Cabinet instructions were given. Is
there any objection? I do not think there is.
Mr. ARTHUR GRIFFITH (MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS):
No.
PRESIDENT DE VALERA:
Here is the actual text of the instructions which I wrote with my own hand at
the Cabinet meeting on the 7th October:-
¶1] The Plenipotentiaries have full powers as defined in their credentials.
¶2] It is understood before decisions are finally reached on the main
question, that a dispatch notifying the intention to make these decisions will
be sent to members of the Cabinet in Dublin, and that a reply will be awaited
by the Plenipotentiaries before final decision is made.
¶3] It is also understood that the complete text of the draft treaty about
to be signed will be similarly submitted to Dublin, and reply awaited.
Now I want you to pay particular attention to that particular paragraph. The
instructions proceed:
¶4] In case of a break, the text of the final proposals from our side will
be similarly submitted.
¶5] It is understood the Cabinet in Dublin will be kept regularly in-
formed of the progress of the negotiations.
That was all done with the exception of paragraph three. It is obvious that a
treaty which would be a lasting agreement between two nations, and which may
govern the relations of nations for centuries, is a document which, even when
you have agreed upon the fundamental principles, should be most care fully
examined. My idea was when the plenipotentiaries had arrived at an agreement on
the treaty, and had a rough copy of a document which they were prepared to sign,
that document, in its full text, would be transmitted, because in the case of a
treaty, even verbal, the exact form of words is of tremendous importance. I have
only to say with respect to paragraph three that the final text was not
submitted. When the previous draft, which considerably differed from the final
text, was submitted, that I said I could not sign, and I do not think the other
members of the Cabinet, whose views on a vital question we had to determine for
ourselves earlier, would sign. With the knowledge that we could not accept that,
the plenipotentiaries, acting in accordance with their rights, signed the
treaty, and as far as the relations between the Cabinet and the
plenipotentiaries are concerned, the only point is that paragraph three was not
carried out to the letter. This was most important, and I feel myself, had it
been done, we might have got complete agreement between the Cabinet and the
plenipotentiaries. I say that in order that everyone may realise that this is a
case of a difference of opinion between two bodies, which in a case like this
would naturally and did naturally arise, and therefore I am anxious that it
should not in any way interfere with the discussion on the treaty which the
plenipotentiaries have brought to us. We are to treat it on its merits. Just as
you probably will hold different opinions on the merits of it, so we in the
Cabinet hold different opinions on it. The main question at issue as far back as
the third week in October was decided by us, and, those who were in favour of
the decision on the side I am taking were certainly a majority of the Cabinet,
though the whole Cabinet was not present at the meeting. I am ready to answer
any questions about the conduct of the negotiations that may be in the public
interest, and if there are any questions, or any matter which you wish to probe,
further that is not in the public interest, I would be glad to answer it in a
private session so that you may understand it thoroughly.
Mr. P. O'KEEFFE (Cork):
Chím anso rún ar an gclár ón Dr. de Faoite. Ba mhaith liom fhios a bheith
agam an bhfuil se chun an rún san do chur os cóir na Dála iniu What is to be
done in regard to Dr. White's motion that the session be held in private? I want
to know is Dr. White going to move the resolution in connection with the notice
of motion on the agenda to-day.
MR. A. GRIFFITH (MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS):
I wish to say as regards any suggestion that the plenipotentiaries exceeded
their instructions, that I, as Chairman of the Delegation, immediately
controvert it.
PRESIDENT DE VALERA:
It will settle nothing if one says one thing and another says the other. What
I said, and I think it will be made evident by an examination, if anybody wishes
to appoint three or four independently to look into the matter, it will be made
evident that paragraph three of the instructions was not exceeded; but paragraph
three was not carried out. The Treaty was signed in the small hours of the
morning after the text---after certain alterations had been made, and we never
saw the alterations. Had I seen it, I would have used any influence I had to try
to secure unanimity in the matter, and then if we could not secure unanimity, we
knew where we were. The chance was lost by the fact that after certain
alterations had been made, instead of sending the final draft to us, and taking
time over it, so that matters could be fully considered, it was rushed
unfortunately. That is all I have got to say about it.
MR. MICHAEL COLLINS (MINISTER FOR FINANCE):
The original terms that were served on each member of the delegation have not
been read out. The thing has already taken an unfair aspect and I am against a
private session. I have no particular feeling about it. I suggest that a vital
matter for the representatives of the nation, and the nation itself, is that the
final document which was agreed on by a united Cabinet, should be put side by
side with the final document which the Delegation of Plenipotentiaries did not
sign as a treaty, but did sign on the understanding that each signatory would
recommend it to the Dáil for acceptance.
DR. V. WHITE (WATERFORD):
I formally propose that this meeting of the Dáil, and, if the Dáil approve of
it, subsequent meetings also, be held in private. Of course this does not
preclude having a session of the Dáil, so approved, public. I do move this
resolution as an humble member of the Dáil, because I for one respectfully
submit to all concerned that certain points---if I might say so, certain
obstructions---require to be cleared away before this all- important, this
terrible question, is decided one way or the other. My chief reasons for
suggesting to the Dáil a private meeting at first are these. These points must,
I respectfully suggest, be cleared up, and secondly, in a private meeting I
think it will be generally conceded that members of any assembly where such an
important question arises will talk more freely and will ask questions with
greater facility. I will not weary the Dáil further, but will formally move that
this meeting of the Dáil and, if the Dáil so approves, other meetings, be held
in private.
Mr. P. O'KEEFFE (CORK):
I beg to second Dr. White's motion.
Mr. D. CEANNT (CORK):
I move that this session and other sessions be held in public. I am
thoroughly dissatisfied with the information we are getting here from time to
time. During the last five or six months---during the truce---my constituents at
home could tell me that letters have been received from members of the staff
that the whole question was settled up two months ago. And yet we are going
around the country without knowing a thing about it. What I want to say is to
repeat what I have been saying to my constituents for the last five or six
years. What I am now about to do and say I am quite prepared to do publicly. I
move that this and all other sessions be public.
Mr. J. O'DWYER (CO. DUBLIN):
I think nobody in this Dáil has the slightest reason to fear publicity. There
is this to be feared, that we here with this enormous responsibility cast upon
us may be slightly over-awed in the first place by the presence of people who
have not got the responsibility that we have. Number two, I feel that we are all
young men and young women in this very important departure in our national
affairs, and it is quite possible that with the best intentions in the world
that we will say things which will bear a construction that we do not intend.
For that reason more than for any other reason, not because I personally fear
publicity, but to secure in the first place a full and free discussion and in
the second place to secure that afterwards we will not be misunderstood, I
support very strongly Dr. White's motion.
MR. R. J. MULCAHY (DUBLIN):
I propose as an amendment that whatever explanations may be required as to
the genesis of the present document, and the present situation, be conducted in
private session but that the motion for the ratification of the Treaty be
brought forward and discussed, and all matters in connection with it dealt with
at the public session.
PRESIDENT DE VALERA:
I second that. It is obviously the reasonable way of dealing with it. This
question of finding out how differences of opinion arose is the only question
that cannot be probed except in private, whereas the big question is a matter
for the whole nation obviously and it should be held in public. The reason for
introducing the explanation at the start on my part is that I want to try to get
rid of any misunderstanding that might be caused by a division of the Cabinet.
There are rumours of various sorts going about and statements being made, such
as, for instance, the statement made by one of the members of the delegation
just now, which are not really a fact. That can be decided only in a private
session satisfactorily. I am very glad to support the motion of the Member for
Clontarf.
MR. SEAN MCENTEE (CO. MONAGHAN):
I am sorry that I find I have to differ from the President in this matter. It
is quite obvious one of the factors which must determine the position of the
Dáil is whether the Dáil is in honour or otherwise bound to ratify the treaty
proposed to them. You cannot, no matter how you try to do it, disassociate the
question from the question of whether plenipotentiaries have exceeded the powers
or instructions given to them. There are some of us to-day who may be called
upon later to justify the positions they are taking before the country. Every
factor that determines the position ought to be made plain to the public and we
ought to be able to say to ourselves, and to say it without fear of
contradiction---and there are the public facts to prove it---that we were not
bound to ratify the treaty which the delegates proposed to us. For that reason
there ought to be no private session of the Dáil except upon one subject---that
which relates to our military, financial or other resources. Remember the Treaty
is not yet ratified. Anything like that which would give information to the
enemy or would be helpful to them in the subversion of Irish liberties should be
private; but all other matters---any matter in which every person in this island
is fully interested---ought to be decided openly and in public.
MR. SEAN MCGARRY (DUBLIN):
I agree with Mr. McEntee. There are one or two little points that ought to be
decided in private session. I wish this session of the Dáil could be held on the
Curragh, so that every man, woman and child in Ireland could hear us. We are
entitled to tell the public what the difference is, and what difference has
been. We have a responsibility to the public that elected us without question.
MR. J. J. WALSH (CORK):
I must say I am in entire agreement with Mr. McEntee. There is nothing which
I am entitled to hear at this meeting which every member of the Irish nation has
not an equal right to hear.
MR. SEAN ETCHINGHAM (WEXFORD):
I agree with the Member for Monaghan. There are matters that should be dealt
with in private, but apart from these, I am anxious that these proceedings
should be conducted before the representatives of the world's Press in the
manner in which the Irish Parliament should be conducted. The country has been
kept in the dark and the people are saying so. The liberty and interests of
Ireland are the concern of every man and woman and boy and girl, and they should
be as conversant with it as any of us. Let us have all the public discussion we
can. The Member for Dublin says he would like to have this meeting at the
Curragh, but we could not be heard down there (laughter). It would be just like
the remark of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, which we would not hear down
here. Let us have a public session ; let us thresh this thing out. We have
nothing to fear, any of us. I believe we are all here in the interests of
Ireland.
MR. MICHAEL COLLINS (MINISTER FOR FINANCE):
I am not in favour of a private session in so far as anything that the Dáil
has a right to know, and in so far as anything that the Irish people, who are
our masters, have a right to know. There may be differences of opinion between
some of us---differences as to past and future action---that members of the Dáil
would be ultimately concerned in before they would make up their minds whether
or not there would be a private session or whether or not the terms should be
ratified. I must again protest against what I call an unfair action, and I do
not call it unfair except from this point of view. If one document had to be
read the original document, which was a prior document, should have been read
first. I must ask the liberty of reading the original document which was served
on each member of the delegation of plenipotentiaries.
PRESIDENT DE VALERA:
Is that the one with the original credentials?
MR. MICHAEL COLLINS (MINISTER fOR FINANCE):
Yes.
PRESIDENT DE VALERA:
Was that ever presented? It was given in order to get the British Government
to recognise the Irish Republic. Was that document giving the credentials of the
accredited representatives from the Irish Government to the British Government
presented to, or accepted by, the British delegates? Was that taken by the
British delegates or accepted by them?
MR. A. GRIFFITH (MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS):
We had no instructions to present it.
PRESIDENT DE VALERA:
I am asking a question.
MR. MICHAEL COLLINS (MINISTER FOR FINANCE):
May I ask that I be allowed to speak without interruption?
PRESIDENT DE VALERA:
I must protest.
MR. P. O'KEEFFE (CORK):
The House has a right to decide the motion that is before it. The Irish
people are our masters and we are the masters of our Cabinet.
THE SPEAKER:
Order; we must have order.
MR. MICHAEL COLLINS (MINISTER FOR FINANCE):
I only ask that I be allowed to speak without interruption. I am not going to
interrupt any speaker and that is a small right to ask.
The original credentials
were presented and they read:
In virtue of the authority vested in me by Dáil Eireann, I hereby appoint
Arthur Griffith, T.D., Minister for Foreign Affairs, Chairman; Michael
Collins, T.D., Minister for Finance; Robert C. Barton, T.D., Minister for
Economic Affairs; Edmund J. Duggan, T.D.; and George Gavan Duffy, T.D. as
envoys plenipotentiaries from the elected Government of the Republic of
Ireland to negotiate and conclude on behalf of Ireland, with the
representatives of his Britannic Majesty George V. a treaty or treaties of
settlement, association and accommodation between Ireland and the community of
nations, known as the British Commonwealth. In witness hereof I hereunder
subscribe my name as President.
Signed
EAMON DE VALERA
and that was sealed with the official seal of Dáil Eireann and dated the 7th day
of October, 1921. Then there were five identical credentials. Now I do not
object to the second document being read, but the prior document should have
been read first and we have agreed, those of us who differ---those of us who
take one stand---to make no statement which would in any way prejudge the issue
until this meeting of Dáil Eireann. Publicly and privately we did not prejudge
the issue; we even refrained from speaking to members of the Dáil. I have not
said a hard word about anybody. I know I have been called a traitor. [Cries
of `no, no'].
PRESIDENT DE VALERA:
By whom?
MR. MICHAEL COLLINS (MINISTER FOR FINANCE):
If I am a traitor, let the Irish people decide it or not, and if there are
men who act towards me as a traitor I am prepared to meet them anywhere, any
time, now as in the past. For that reason I do not want the issue prejudged. I
am in favour of a public session here now. I understand that members of the Dáil
may differ as to the advantage to be gained on one side or the other by a
private session. If there is anything, any matter of detail, if, for instance,
the differences between plenipotentiaries, and the differences as they arose
from time to time, should be discussed first in private, I am of opinion that
having discussed it in private, I think we ought then to be able to make it
public. I am willing to go so far as that; that is only detail. But on the
essentials I am for publicity now and all along. May I just put one point right?
It is important that it should be stated because it rather puts us at a
disadvantage. I agree with what the President said that the honour of Ireland
was not involved in accepting this document. Ireland is fully free to accept or
reject. Many a parliament of a country has refused to accept decisions of
plenipotentiaries even if these decisions might be considered legally and
morally more binding than the present decisions. I can only make plain again
that the document is agreed to by the signatories and recommended to the Dáil
for acceptance. If the Dáil do not accept it, I as one of the signatories will
be relieved of all responsibility for myself, but I am bound to recommend it
over my signature and of course we are bound to take action---whatever action
was implied by our signing the document. The Dáil is perfectly free to accept or
reject, we are only bound to recommend it to the Dáil for acceptance. The
Articles of Agreement are put forward on our recommendation. That ought to be
quite clear here, and ought to be equally clear to the public of this country,
and the other country, the representatives of which have their signatures on the
document also.
PRESIDENT DE VALERA:
The main point is settled. By the admission of the delegates themselves, and
it is the only thing we are concerned with here, we did not send them, and it
would be ridiculous to think that we could send five men to complete a treaty
without the right of ratification by this assembly. That is the only thing that
matters. Therefore it is agreed that this Treaty is simply an agreement and that
it is not binding until the Dáil ratifies it. That is what we are concerned
with. Now as to the differences that have arisen. I did not read out that first
document because I was informed that it had not been accepted, in other words it
had not been presented. It was given to safeguard the plenipotentiaries going
over in case they should be asked by one Government from another: `Where is your
authority to negotiate a Treaty with us?' I am very glad to know that the Prime
Minister has accepted that document from the Irish Republic. Now we all can go
back to meetings of the Dáil. At these meetings I made our position perfectly
clear, that the plenipotentiaries were to have the fullest freedom possible. It
would be ridiculous to send them over if we were all the time to interfere with
them from Dublin. There was an understanding that certain things would be done
so that we in Dublin would be in a position to help in so far as we could help
to come to an agreement or explain disagreements. The most important paragraph
in these instructions, and its importance will at once appeal to every
reasonable person, was paragraph 3, which laid down that a complete draft of the
Treaty should be submitted to Dublin and a reply awaited. That is a document
every line of which was going to govern the relations of two countries for
perhaps centuries, and it was important that that document should not be
hurriedly signed and that there should be a certain delay. In fact one of the
reasons I did not want to be a member of the delegation was that the delegation
should be provided against hasty action. I do not mean to say that if we had
signed finally the document it would have mattered. There would have probably
been a division. I would not have referred to it at all but all sorts of
misunderstandings have been created in the minds of the people about it. I want
to get rid of that as a disturbing factor in your minds when making out the
merits, or not, of the agreement; we hold one view, the delegates another.
MR. M. HAYES (NATIONAL UNIVERSITY):
There is a motion before the House, and the motion distinctly provides that
the ratification should be moved in public, and therefore it seems to me that
members who desire to speak will get ample opportunities for stating their views
in public. I think that every member of this House should state his or her views
for or against the ratification of this treaty in the most public manner
possible. The motion before the House provides for that---that a public session
shall be held on the motion for ratification. In regard to other matters---our
resources, military, financial or otherwise---questions relating to matters of
this kind should surely be dealt with in private. I think, therefore, you should
begin with a private session, on the understanding as clearly defined by the
motion, that when the question of ratification comes up it should be discussed
in public.
THE SPEAKER:
I suggest that Dr. White's motion and the motion of the Member for Clontarf
Division might be reconciled in this form---that the Dáil go temporarily into
private session.
DR. WHITE (WATERFORD):
I am quite agreeable to that suggestion.
MR. CATHAL BRUGHA (MINISTER FOR DEFENCE):
Táim-se na choinnibh sin. Do reir a bhfuil ráite ag sna daoine atá i
bhfabhar an tsocruithe níl einní acu le ceilt. I object to a private
session.
MR. J. J. O'KELLY (LOUTH):
On a point of order there is one important matter I would like to clear up.
The President has stated on the authority of the Minister for Finance that the
original document read by the Minister for Finance was presented to and accepted
by the British Premier. Now I would like anyone here to have impressed on him
the importance of that statement and of that position. I would like to put that
question for a final and authoritative answer as to the document referred to
having been presented to the Prime Minister and accepted by the Prime Minister
as the original credentials of our delegation.
MR. MICHAEL COLLINS (MINISTER FOR FINANCE):
I do not wish to create a wrong impression. I did not say accepted, I said
presented.
PRESIDENT DE VALERA:
It is very important on the question being bound. We are dealing with other
people who have signed the Treaty. If these people were led to understand that
the signing of that Treaty ended the matter, then we have nothing here to do. If
any document was presented to them that would give them the impression, and if
they accepted that document and wished to interpret into the word conclude
that ratification was not necessary, that would be in despite of the fact that
we here in appointing plenipotentiaries in two sessions made it clear
ratification was necessary.
THE SPEAKER:
We must dispose of the motion.
MR. A. STACK (MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS):
Clear up the point.
PRESIDENT DE VALERA:
This is a most important matter. In the original credentials, in order to
give them the fullest powers, they were empowered---using the technical
term---to negotiate and conclude a Treaty. Evidently the Minister for Finance
wishes to lay stress on the word conclude .
MR. MICHAEL COLLINS (MINISTER FOR FINANCE):
No, sir.
PRESIDENT DE VALERA:
What is the point then of raising the original credentials, if the word
conclude did not mean that when you had signed it was ended. I want to know
whether the delegation of the British Government accepted these credentials as
the basis.
MR. M. P. COLIVET (LIMERICK):
There is a motion before the House that we go into private session.
PRESIDENT DE VALERA:
It is most important that we should know where we are in this matter. The
honour of this nation, which is dear to us, is at stake; I say it was never
intended that the plenipotentiaries---that the five people sent from this
nation---should have power to bind this nation by their signatures irrevocably.
There is no sense making a point of my original credentials unless it means
conclude . The whole bearing of that would have to be considered from a very
technical point of view. It is a technical term. Lest there should be any
misunderstanding about it I want to know whether the British Government accepted
the credentials as the basis on which they accepted you as plenipotentiaries to
negotiate a treaty or not.
Dr. MCCARTAN (LEIX AND OFFALY):
I do not think the question arises. The delegates had full powers to conclude
a Treaty, and that treaty has to be submitted to the Dáil as it has to be
submitted to the British Legislature. The Delegates had power to conclude a
Treaty. They had plenary powers and it is for us now to accept or reject what
they have agreed to. The argument about the word conclude does not arise.
MR. SEAN MCGARRY (DUBLIN):
I think that the question of the right of the Dáil to ratify or reject the
agreement has never been questioned.
PRESIDENT DE VALERA:
It was suggested that I was hiding something from the House.
THE SPEAKER:
The House is really discussing Motion No. 2.
MR. A. GRIFFITH (MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS):
There will be no wrong impression at all events in the minds of members who
have to vote. These credentials were carried from President de Valera. We were
instructed if the British Delegates asked for credentials to present them.
MR. A. STACK (MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS):
They were not presented.
MR. A. GRIFFITH (MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS):
I believe Mr. Lloyd George saw the document. They were not presented or
accepted. The point President de VALERA wants to know about is as to whether we
considered that we had full power to make a treaty to bind the nation without
the Dáil being consulted. Now the British Ministers did not sign the Treaty to
bind their nation. They had to go to their Parliament and we to ours for
ratification.
MR. LIAM DE ROISTE (CORK):
As one who in previous sessions stood up for the rights of the private
members, I think that the motion should be put. I think the members of the Dáil
here are masters of the Cabinet as the Irish people are ours. I must ask you as
Chairman of this assembly to put the motion.
THE SPEAKER:
I made a suggestion to get the motion into satisfactory form. The motion in
Dr. White's name is that the session be held in private. That would mean the
whole session. The amendment by the Member for Clontarf Division is
unnecessarily long, I think. To my mind it would be sufficient if it said that
the Dáil was to go temporarily into private session, because when it does go
into private session you cannot limit the points the Dáil may discuss. Therefore
I suggest that it would meet the case that the Dáil should go temporarily into
private session.
MR. G. GAVAN DUFFY (CO. DUBLIN):
I hope the Speaker's suggestion will not be accepted. The amendment of the
Member for Clontarf restricts the public session. I have no objection to that as
long as the motion for the ratification of the Treaty will be discussed in
public.
THE SPEAKER:
I have not made any suggestion that would limit public discussion. In fact
the only point in my mind is to simplify procedure.
MR. D. O'CALLAGHAN (CORK):
Upon this question of a public session may I suggest that we are all vitally
concerned in the matter before us and that we will not be found lined up for or
against ratification, and that our attitude will not be for the justification of
one particular set of men or another, but having before us the unquestioned
patriotism of every man and woman in the Dáil, that the only concern of every
individual member of the Dáil or Cabinet is the best interests of the country. I
think, and I am not very optimistic in that, that the result will not be a
barren discussion one way or another, meaning naturally disaster to the country,
but will result in a decision which will be satisfactory from the point of view
of all concerned here and to the country as a whole.
MR. SEAN ETCHINGHAM (WEXFORD):
We have had the President's statement. Are we going to consider the
ratification of the Treaty?
THE SPEAKER:
The Member for Wexford has spoken already.
MR. A. STACK (MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS):
Would I be in order in making a further amendment?
THE SPEAKER:
Not until the amendment by the Member for Clontarf is disposed of. It is:
That any explanations as regards the genesis of the Proposed Treaty in the
present situation be given and discussed in Private session, but that the
introduction of the proposed Treaty itself and the discussion thereon take
place in public session.
The amendment was put and carried.
MR. A. STACK (MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS):
I move the further amendment:
That the session of An Dáil be held in public until such time as a matter
arises which the Dáil considers should be discussed in Private session.
COUNTESS MARKIEVICZ (MINISTER FOR LABOUR)
Seconded.
MR. COSGRAVE (MINISTER FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENT):
May I respectfully draw your attention to No. 8 of the rules of debate by
members, which states that the subject under discussion should be kept to, and
another rule is that a member is not allowed to speak more than once.
The SPEAKER was proceeding to put the amendment to the House, when,
MR.D. MCCARTHY (DUBLIN):
Do you really think that in order? I do not think it is an amendment at all.
THE SPEAKER:
Oh, yes, it is a valid amendment?
MR. M. P. COLIVET (LIMERICK):
Is not the last amendment a direct negative to the previous amendment?
PRESIDENT DE VALERA:
I suggest that some people think if we go into private session that we might
not come out in public session at all.
MR. M. HAYES (NATIONAL UNIVERSITY):
We must go into public session on the motion for the ratification of this
Treaty.
THE SPEAKER:
The difficulty with regard to the amendment is that it does not regulate any
time at which the private session should take place.
MR. CATHAL BRUGHA (MINISTER FOR DEFENCE):
Whenever anyone thinks that we should go into private session let him say so,
and let him tell us the reason why we should do so.
MR. S. MILROY (CAVAN AND FERMANAGH):
I think so far as this last amendment is concerned it resembles something
like a Jack-in-the-Box as regards when we retire into private and come out into
public session.
THE SPEAKER:
Certainly, it would raise a great difficulty in regard to the order of
procedure.
MR. J. MCDONAGH (DIRECTOR OF BELFAST BOYCOTT):
The only thing I think that should be definite is that the question of the
ratification of the Treaty should be in public session. If it is definitely
decided that the question of the ratification has to be in public session I do
not think anyone objects to a private session before that---if it is absolutely
understood that the ratification of the treaty should be in public.
THE SPEAKER:
I take that to be the unanimous desire of the Dáil.
MR. R. MULCAHY (DUBLIN):
The objection I see to the amendment is that the question of private or
public session will cross the tracks of every single question requiring
explanation that comes before us.
MR. CATHAL BRUGHA (MINISTER FOR DEFENCE):
Therefore do not go into private session.
THE SPEAKER:
It is the general wish that the motion for ratification should be discussed
in public session. In putting the amendment I do not see how I or anyone in my
place can regulate the order of procedure.
The SPEAKER put the amendment which was defeated and the previous
amendment was put as a substantive motion and passed.
MR. MICHAEL COLLINS (MINISTER FOR FINANCE):
I suggest it is only right to the Press and public that we should give
definite times and state the limit of the private session so that they may be
facilitated.
PRESIDENT DE VALERA:
I propose that we take the private session this afternoon and that we go into
public session at 11 o'clock in the morning. This means that we continue the
meeting this afternoon, and we meet tomorrow for the sole question of
ratification.
THE SPEAKER:
I suggest it would save trouble to retire now, if we adjourn until the
afternoon session.
PRESIDENT DE VALERA:
I suggest we keep on until 2 o'clock. We probably could dispose of the points
of difference in an hour. If not we can meet again at 3.30. I propose we should
meet in private session until 2 o'clock and if not finished then we shall resume
at 3.30, and that when we meet to-morrow morning at 11 o'clock we shall take the
motion on the question of ratification.
This concluded the public sitting.
THE SPEAKER (DR. EOIN MAC NEILL) took the Chair at 11.25 a.m. The
Secretary, MR. Diarmuid O hEigceartuigh, called the roll.
THE SPEAKER:
The President informs the House that the document presented to the Dáil for a
certain purpose at the Private Session is now withdrawn and must be regarded as
confidential until he brings his own proposal forward formally.
MR. A. GRIFFITH (MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS):
Am I to understand, Sir, that that document we discussed at the Private
Session is to be withheld from the Irish people?
PRESIDENT DE VALERA:
No. But I don't want to have the debate interfered with, the direct debate on
the Treaty, by a discussion on a secondary document put forward for a certain
purpose in Private Session. That document will be put forward in its proper
place.
MR. GRIFFITH (MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS):
I want to know is the document we discussed as an alternative to be withheld
from the Irish people, or is it to be published in the Press for the people to
see?
PRESIDENT DE VALERA:
I put forward the document for a distinct purpose to see whether we could get
a unanimous proposition by this House. That has not been achieved. I am going to
put forward the proposal myself definitely to this House as my own proposition
which I stand for. That was for a different purpose.
MR. SEAN MILROY (CAVAN):
Before that document can be regarded as private, I think the President will
have to get the assent of this House. We weren't informed it was merely for
private discussion. This is a matter that goes to the root of the whole issue
before this House, and I think it a rather curious point to raise now when the
Public Session has begun, that we should be informed that it is to be regarded
as a confidential document. I, for my part, refuse until this House assents to
that proposition.
THE SPEAKER:
We cannot have a discussion on this at this point. The only matter that
arises is that the President's request as read out by me has been expressed to
the House. We must now proceed with the orders of the day.
MR. GRIFFITH (MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS):
A Chinn Chomhairle, I submit I am here to move this. Are my hands to
be tied by this document being withheld after we were discussing it for two
days?
MADAME MARKIEVICZ (SOUTH DUBLIN):
I wish to say that when the document was given to me it was distinctly stated
it was confidential, and I have treated it as such.
PRESIDENT DE VALERA:
I have no objection to the document going anywhere, except this, that I
wanted this House, if possible, to have a united policy. I was prepared to stand
on a certain document. It would cease to be of value unless it was a document
that would command practically the unanimous approval of the assembly. It was
given to the assembly distinctly on that understanding to get objections to it.
I intend proposing what I want to stand on as my own proposition before the
Irish people. That was not my proposal definitely; it was a paper put in in
order to elicit views. I am ready to put my proposition in its proper place,
both before this assembly and before the Irish nation. I have asked it to be
treated as confidential because there are other documents necessary to explain
its genesis. Unless you want all the confidential documents of the whole
conference proceedings published, then I hold you cannot publish that.
MR. MICHAEL COLLINS (MINISTER FOR FINANCE):
I as a public representative cannot consent, if I am in a minority of one, in
withholding from the Irish people my knowledge of what the alternative is. We
have to deal with this matter in the full light of our own responsibility to our
people, and I cannot in my public statement refrain from telling the Irish
people what certain alternatives are.
PRESIDENT DE VALERA:
It is not proposed to withhold either that document or any documents from the
Irish people, if this House wishes it, in its proper place, but I hold it is
running across the course of the debate to introduce now for the public a
document which has been discussed in Private Session. It means that the Private
Session might as well not have been held.
THE SPEAKER:
I wish the members to understand that this is not a matter of the Chair's
ruling that this document is confidential. It is simply a matter of a request
made by the President and communicated by me to the Dáil, through the ordinary
courtesy of procedure, as the President's desire. I do not make any ruling on
it, but any discussion on it is out of order. We most proceed now with the
orders of the day.
MR. GRIFFITH (MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS):
It is not a question of courtesy; it is not a question of the rules of
procedure; it is a question of the lives and fortunes of the people of Ireland.
While I shall so far as I can respect President de Valera's wish, I am not going
to hide from the Irish people what the alternative is that is proposed. I move
the motion standing in my name---
That Dáil Eireann approves of the Treaty between Great Britain and Ireland,
signed in London on December 6th, 1921.
Nearly three months ago Dáil Eireann appointed plenipotentiaries to go to London
to treat with the British Government and to make a bargain with them. We have
made a bargain. We have brought it back. We were to go there to reconcile our
aspirations with the association of the community of nations known as the
British Empire. That task which was given to us was as hard as was ever placed
on the shoulders of men. We faced that task; we knew that whatever happened we
would have our critics, and we made up our minds to do whatever was right and
disregard whatever criticism might occur. We could have shirked the
responsibility. We did not seek to act as the plenipotentiaries; other men were
asked and other men refused. We went. The responsibility is on our shoulders; we
took the responsibility in London and we take the responsibility in Dublin. I
signed that Treaty not as the ideal thing, but fully believing, as I believe
now, it is a treaty honourable to Ireland, and safeguards the vital interests of
Ireland.
And now by that Treaty I am going to stand, and every man with a scrap of
honour who signed it is going to stand. It is for the Irish people---who are our
masters [hear, hear] not our servants as some think---it is for
the Irish people to say whether it is good enough. I hold that it is, and I hold
that the Irish people---that 95 per cent of them believe it to be good enough.
We are here, not as the dictators of the Irish People, but as the
representatives of the Irish people, and if we misrepresent the Irish people,
then the moral authority of Dáil Eireann, the strength behind it, and the fact
that Dáil Eireann spoke the voice of the Irish people, is gone, and gone for
ever. Now, the President--- and I am in a difficult position---does not wish a
certain document referred to read. But I must refer to the substance of it. An
effort has been made outside to represent that a certain number of men stood
uncompromisingly on the rock of the Republic---the Republic, and nothing but the
Republic.
It has been stated also here that the man who made this position, the man who
won the war---Michael Collins---compromised Ireland's rights. In the letters
that preceded the negotiations not once was a demand made for recognition of the
Irish Republic. If it had been made we knew it would have BEEN refused. We went
there to see how to reconcile the two positions, and I hold we have done it. The
President does not wish this document to be read. What am I to do? What am I to
say? Am I to keep my mouth shut and let the Irish people think about this
uncompromising rock?
PRESIDENT DE VALERA:
I will make my position in my speech quite clear.
MR. GRIFFITH (MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS):
What we have to say is this, that the difference in this Cabinet and in this
House is between half-recognising the British King and the British Empire, and
between marching in, as one of the speakers said, with our heads up. The
gentlemen on the other side are prepared to recognise the King of England as
head of the British Commonwealth. They are prepared to go half in the Empire and
half out. They are prepared to go into the Empire for war and peace and
treaties, and to keep out for other matters, and that is what the Irish people
have got to know is the difference. Does all this quibble of words---because it
is merely a quibble of words---mean that Ireland is asked to throw away this
Treaty and go back to war? So far as my power or voice extends, not one young
Irishman's life shall be lost on that quibble. We owe responsibility to the
Irish people. I feel my responsibility to the Irish people, and the Irish people
must know, and know in every detail, the difference that exists between us, and
the Irish people must be our judges. When the plenipotentiaries came back they
were sought to be put in the dock. Well, if I am going to be tried, I am going
to be tried by the people of Ireland [hear, hear]. Now this Treaty
has been attacked. It has been examined with a microscope to find its defects,
and this little thing and that little thing has been pointed out, and the people
are told---one of the gentlemen said it here---that it was less even than the
proposals of July. It is the first Treaty between the representatives of the
Irish Government and the representatives of the English Government since 1172
signed on equal footing. It is the first Treaty that admits the equality of
Ireland. It is a Treaty of equality, and because of that I am standing by it. We
have come back from London with that Treaty---Saorstát na hEireann
recognised---the Free State of Ireland. We have brought back the flag; we have
brought back the evacuation of Ireland after 700 years by British troops and the
formation of an Irish army [applause]. We have brought back to
Ireland her full rights and powers of fiscal control. We have brought back to
Ireland equality with England, equality with all nations which form that
Commonwealth, and an equal voice in the direction of foreign affairs in peace
and war. Well, we are told that that Treaty is a derogation from our status;
that it is a Treaty not to be accepted, that it is a poor thing, and that the
Irish people ought to go back and fight for something more, and that something
more is what I describe as a quibble of words. Now, I shall have an opportunity
later on of replying to the very formidably arranged criticism that is going to
be levelled at the Treaty to show its defects. At all events, the Irish people
are a people of great common sense. They know that a Treaty that gives them
their flag and their Free State and their Army (cheers) is not a sham Treaty,
and the sophists and the men of words will not mislead them, I tell you. In
connection with the Treaty men said this and said that, and I was requested to
get from Mr. Lloyd George a definite statement covering points in the Treaty
which some gentlemen misunderstood. This is Mr. Lloyd George's letter:
10, Downing Street, S.W. 1 12th December, 1921.Sir,---
As doubts may be expressed regarding certain points not specifically
mentioned in the Treaty terms, I think it is important that their meaning
should be clearly understood.
The first question relates to the method of appointment of the
Representatives of the Crown in Ireland. Article III. of the Agreement lays
down that he is to be appointed `in like manner as the Governor-General of
Canada and in accordance with the Practice observed in the making of such
appointment'. This means that the Government of the Irish Free State will be
consulted so as to ensure a selection acceptable to the Irish Government
before any recommendation is made to his Majesty.
The second question is as to the scope of the Arbitration contemplated in
Article V. regarding Ireland's liability for a share of War Pensions and the
Public Debt. The procedure contemplated by the Conference was that the British
Government should submit its claim, and that the Government of the Irish Free
State should submit any counter-claim to which it thought Ireland entitled.
Upon the case so submitted the Arbitrators would decide after making such
further inquiries as they might think necessary; their decision would then be
final and binding on both parties. It is, of course, understood that the
arbitrator or arbitrators to whom the case is referred shall be men as to
whose impartiality both the British Government and the Government of the Irish
Free State are satisfied.
The third question relates to the status of the Irish Free State. The
special arrangements agreed between us in Articles VI., VII., VIII. and IX.,
which are not in the Canadian constitution, in no way affect status. They are
necessitated by the proximity and interdependence of the two islands by
conditions, that is, which do not exist in the case of Canada.
They in no way affect the position of the Irish Free State in the
Commonwealth or its title to representation, like Canada, in the Assembly of
the League of Nations. They were agreed between us for our mutual benefit, and
have no bearing of any kind upon the question of status. It is our desire that
Ireland shall rank as co-equal with the other nations of the Commonwealth, and
we are ready to support her claim to a similar place in the League of Nations
as soon as her new Constitution comes into effect.
The framing of that Constitution will be in the hands of the Irish
Government, subject, of course, to the terms of Agreement, and to the pledges
given in respect of the minority by the head of the Irish Delegation. The
establishment and composition of the Second Chamber is, therefore, in the
discretion of the Irish people. There is nothing in the Articles of Agreement
to suggest that Ireland is in this respect bound to the Canadian model.
I may add that we propose to begin withdrawing the Military and Auxiliary
Forces of the Crown in Southern Ireland when the Articles of Agreement are
ratified.
I am, Sir, Your obedient Servant,
D. LLOYD GEORGE.
Various different methods of attack on this Treaty have been made. One of
them was they did not mean to keep it. Well, they have ratified it, and it can
come into operation inside a fortnight. We think they do mean to keep it if we
keep it. They are pledged now before the world, pledged by their signature, and
if they depart from it they will be disgraced and we will be stronger in the
world's eyes than we are today. During the last few years a war was waged on the
Irish people, and the Irish people defended themselves, and for a portion of
that time, when President de Valera was in America, I had at least the
responsibility on my shoulders of standing for all that was done in that defence,
and I stood for it [applause]. I would stand for it again under
similar conditions. Ireland was fighting then against an enemy that was striking
at her life, and was denying her liberty, but in any contest that would follow
the rejection of this offer Ireland would be fighting with the sympathy of the
world against her, and with all the Dominions---all the nations that comprise
the British Commonwealth---against her.
The position would be such that I believe no conscientious Irishman could
take the responsibility for a single Irishman's life in that futile war. Now,
many criticisms, I know, will be levelled against this Treaty; one in
particular, one that is in many instances quite honest, it is the question of
the oath. I ask the members to see what the oath is, to read it, not to
misunderstand or misrepresent it. It is an oath of allegiance to the
Constitution of the Free State of Ireland and of faithfulness to King George V.
in his capacity as head and in virtue of the common citizenship of Ireland with
Great Britain and the other nations comprising the British Commonwealth. That is
an oath, I say, that any Irishman could take with honour. He pledges his
allegiance to his country and to be faithful to this Treaty, and faithfulness
after to the head of the British Commonwealth of Nations. If his country were
unjustly used by any of the nations of that Commonwealth, or its head, then his
allegiance is to his own country and his allegiance bids him to resist. [hear,
hear]
We took an oath to the Irish Republic, but, as President de Valera himself said, he understood that oath to bind him to do the best he could
for Ireland. So do we. We have done the best we could for Ireland. If the Irish
people say `We have got everything else but the name Republic, and we will fight
for it', I would say to them that they are fools, but I will follow in the
ranks. I will take no responsibility. But the Irish people will not do that. Now
it has become rather a custom for men to speak of what they did, and did not do,
in the past. I am not going to speak of that aspect, except one thing. It is
this. The prophet I followed throughout my life, the man whose words and
teachings I tried to translate into practice in politics, the man whom I revered
above all Irish patriots was Thomas Davis. In the hard way of fitting practical
affairs into idealism I have made Thomas Davis my guide. I have never departed
in my life one inch from the principles of Thomas Davis, and in signing this
Treaty and bringing it here and asking Ireland to ratify it I am following
Thomas Davis still. Later on, when coming to reply to criticism, I will deal
with the other matters. Thomas Davis said:
Peace with England, alliance with England to some extent, and, under
certain circumstances, confederation with England; but an Irish ambition,
Irish hopes, strength, virtue, and rewards for the Irish.
That is what we have brought back, peace with England, alliance with England,
confederation with England, an Ireland developing her own life, carving out her
own way of existence, and rebuilding the Gaelic civilisation broken down at the
battle of Kinsale. I say we have brought you that. I say we have translated
Thomas Davis into the practical politics of the day. I ask then this Dáil to
pass this resolution, and I ask the people of Ireland, and the Irish people
everywhere, to ratify this Treaty, to end this bitter conflict of centuries, to
end it for ever, to take away that poison that has been rankling in the two
countries and ruining the relationship of good neighbours. Let us stand as free
partners, equal with England, and make after 700 years the greatest revolution
that has ever been made in the history of the world---a revolution of seeing the
two countries standing not apart as enemies, but standing together as equals and
as friends. I ask you, therefore, to pass this resolution [applause].
COMMANDANT SEAN MACKEON (LONGFORD AND WESTMEATH):
A Chinn Chomhairle I rise to second the motion, as proposed by the
Deputy for West Cavan (Arthur Griffith) and Chairman of the Irish Delegation in
London. In doing so, I take this course because I know I am doing it in the
interests of my country, which I love. To me symbols, recognitions, shadows,
have very little meaning. What I want, what the people of Ireland want, is not
shadows but substances, and I hold that this Treaty between the two nations
gives us not shadows but real substances, and for that reason I am ready to
support it. Furthermore, this Treaty gives Ireland the chance for the first time
in 700 years to develop her own life in her own way, to develop Ireland for all,
every man and woman, without distinction of creed or class or politics. To me
this Treaty gives me what I and my comrades fought for; it gives us for the
first time in 700 years the evacuation of Britain's armed forces out of Ireland.
It also gives me my hope and dream, our own Army, not half-equipped, but fully
equipped, to defend our interests. If the Treaty were much worse in words than
it is alleged to be, once it gave me these two things, I would take it and say
as long as the armed forces of Britain are gone and the armed forces of Ireland
remain, we can develop our own nation in our own way. Furthermore, when it gives
us this army it simply means that it is a guarantee that England or England's
King will be faithful to us. If he is not, if the King is not faithful to us,
well, we will have somebody left who will defend our interests and see that they
are safeguarded. It may seem rather peculiar that one like me who is regarded as
an extremist should take this step. Yes, to the world and to Ireland I say I am
an extremist, but it means that I have an extreme love of my country. It was
love of my country that made me and every other Irishman take up arms to defend
her. It was love of my country that made me ready, and every other Irishman
ready, to die for her if necessary. This Treaty brings the freedom that is
necessary, it brings the freedom that we all were ready to die for, that is,
that Ireland be allowed to develop her own life in her own way, without any
interference from any other Government whether English or otherwise [applause].
PRESIDENT DE VALERA:
I think it would scarcely be in accordance with Standing Orders of the Dáil
if I were to move directly the rejection of this Treaty. I daresay, however, it
will be sufficient that I should appeal to this House not to approve of the
Treaty. We were elected by the Irish people, and did the Irish people think we
were liars when we said that we meant to uphold the Republic, which was ratified
by the vote of the people three years ago, and was further ratified---expressly
ratified---by the vote of the people at the elections last May? When the
proposal for negotiation came from the British Government asking that we should
try by negotiation to reconcile Irish national aspirations with the association
of nations forming the British Empire, there was no one here as strong as I was
to make sure that every human attempt should be made to find whether such
reconciliation was possible. I am against this Treaty because it does not
reconcile Irish national aspirations with association with the British
Government. I am against this Treaty, not because I am a man of war, but a man
of peace. I am against this Treaty because it will not end the centuries of
conflict between the two nations of Great Britain and Ireland.
We went out to effect such a reconciliation and we have brought back a thing
which will not even reconcile our own people much less reconcile Britain and
Ireland.
If there was to be reconciliation, it is obvious that the party in Ireland
which typifies national aspirations for centuries should be satisfied, and the
test of every agreement would be the test of whether the people were satisfied
or not. A war-weary people will take things which are not in accordance with
their aspirations. You may have a snatch election now, and you may get a vote of
the people, but I will tell you that Treaty will renew the contest that is going
to begin the same history that the Union began, and Lloyd George is going to
have the same fruit for his labours as Pitt had. When in Downing Street the
proposals to which we could unanimously assent in the Cabinet were practically
turned down at the point of the pistol and immediate war was threatened upon our
people. It was only then that this document was signed, and that document has
been signed by plenipotentiaries, not perhaps individually under duress, but it
has been signed, and would only affect this nation as a document signed under
duress, and this nation would not respect it.
I wanted, and the Cabinet wanted, to get a document we could stand by, a
document that could enable Irishmen to meet Englishmen and shake hands with them
as fellow-citizens of the world. That document makes British authority our
masters in Ireland. It was said that they had only an oath to the British King
in virtue of common citizenship, but you have an oath to the Irish Constitution,
and that Constitution will be a Constitution which will have the King of Great
Britain as head of Ireland. You will swear allegiance to that Constitution and
to that King; and if the representatives of the Republic should ask the people
of Ireland to do that which is inconsistent with the Republic, I say they are
subverting the Republic. It would be a surrender which was never heard of in
Ireland since the days of Henry II.; and are we in this generation, which has
made Irishmen famous through out the world, to sign our names to the most
ignoble document that could be signed.
When I was in prison in solitary confinement our warders told us that we
could go from our cells into the hall, which was about fifty feet by forty. We
did go out from the cells to the hall, but we did not give our word to the
British jailer that he had the right to detain us in prison because we got that
privilege. Again on another occasion we were told that we could get out to a
garden party, where we could see the flowers and the hills, but we did not for
the privilege of going out to garden parties sign a document handing over our
souls and bodies to the jailers. Rather than sign a document which would give
Britain authority in Ireland they should be ready to go into slavery until the
Almighty had blotted out their tyrants [applause]. If the British
government passed a Home Rule Act or something of that kind I would not have
said to the Irish people, `Do not take it'. I would have said, `Very well; this
is a case of the jailer leading you from the cell to the hall,' but by getting
that we did not sign away our right to whatever form of government we pleased.
It was said that an uncompromising stand for a Republic was not made. The stand
made by some of them was to try and reconcile a Republic with an association.
There was a document presented to this House to try to get unanimity, to see
whether the views which I hold could be reconciled to that party which typified
the national aspirations of Ireland for centuries. The document was put there
for that purpose, and I defy anybody in this House to say otherwise than that I
was trying to bring forward before this assembly a document which would bring
real peace between Great Britain and Ireland---a sort of document we would have
tried to get and would not have agreed if we did not get. It would be a document
that would give real peace to the people of Great Britain and Ireland and not
the officials. I know it would not be a politicians' peace. I know the
politician in England who would take it would risk his political future, but it
would be a peace between peoples, and would be consistent with the Irish people
being full masters of everything within their own shores. Criticism of this
Treaty is scarcely necessary from this point of view, that it could not be
ratified because it would not be legal for this assembly to ratify it, because
it would be inconsistent with our position. We were elected here to be the
guardians of an independent Irish State---a State that had declared its
independence---and this House could no more than the ignominious House that
voted away the Colonial Parliament that was in Ireland in 1800 unless we wished
to follow the example of that House and vote away the independence of our
people. We could not ratify that instrument if it were brought before us for
ratification. It is, therefore, to be brought before us not for ratification,
because it would be inconsistent, and the very fact that it is inconsistent
shows that it could not be reconciled with Irish aspirations, because the
aspirations of the Irish people have been crystallised into the form of
Government they have at the present time. As far as I was concerned, I am
probably the freest man here to express my opinion. Before I was elected
President at the Private Session, I said, `Remember I do not take, as far as I
am concerned, oaths as regards forms of Government. I regard myself here to
maintain the independence of Ireland and
to do the best for the Irish people',
and it is to do the best for the Irish people that I ask you not to approve but
to reject this Treaty.
You will be asked in the best interests of Ireland, if you pretend to the
world that this will lay the foundation of a lasting peace, and you know
perfectly well that even if Mr. Griffith and Mr. Collins set up a Provisional
Government in Dublin Castle, until the Irish people would have voted upon it the
Government would be looked upon as a usurpation equally with Dublin Castle in
the past. We know perfectly well there is nobody here who has expressed more
strongly dissent from any attacks of any kind upon the delegates that went to
London than I did.
There is no one who knew better than I did how difficult is the task they had
to perform. I appealed to the Dáil, telling them the delegates had to do
something a mighty army or a mighty navy would not be able to do. I hold that,
and I hold that it was in their excessive love for Ireland they have done what
they have. I am as anxious as anyone for the material prosperity of Ireland and
the Irish people, but I cannot do anything that would make the Irish people hang
their heads. I would rather see the same thing over again than that Irishmen
should have to hang their heads in shame for having signed and put their hands
to a document handing over their authority to a foreign country. The Irish
people would not want me to save them materially at the expense of their
national honour. I say it is quite within the competence of the Irish people if
they wished to enter into an association with other peoples, to enter into the
British Empire; it is within their competence if they want to choose the British
monarch as their King, but does this assembly think the Irish people have
changed so much within the past year or two that they now want to get into the
British Empire after seven centuries of fighting? Have they so changed that they
now want to choose the person of the British monarch, whose forces they have
been fighting against, and who have been associated with all the barbarities of
the past couple of years; have they changed so much that they want to choose the
King as their monarch? It is not King George as a monarch they choose: it is
Lloyd George, because it is not the personal monarch they are choosing, it is
British power and authority as sovereign authority in this country. The sad part
of it, as I was saying, is that a grand peace could at this moment be made, and
to see the difference. I say, for instance, if approved by the Irish people, and
if Mr. Griffith, or whoever might be in his place, thought it wise to ask King
George over to open Parliament he would see
black flags in the streets of
Dublin. Do you think that that would make for harmony between the two peoples?
What would the people of Great Britain say when they saw the King accepted by
the Irish people greeted in Dublin with black flags? If a Treaty was entered
into, if it was a right Treaty, he could have been brought here [No, no].
Yes, he could [cries of `No, no']. Why not? I say if a proper
peace had been made you could bring, for instance, the President of France, the
King of Spain, or the President of America here, or the head of any other
friendly nation here in the name of the Irish State, and the Irish people would
extend to them in a very different way a welcome as the head of a friendly
nation coming on a friendly visit to their country, and not as a monarch who
came to call Ireland his legitimate possession. In one case the Irish people
would regard him as a usurper, in the other case it would be the same as a
distinguished visitor to their country. Therefore, I am against the Treaty,
because it does not do the fundamental thing and bring us peace. The Treaty
leaves us a country going through a period of internal strife just as the Act of
Union did.
One of the great misfortunes in Ireland for past centuries has been the fact
that our internal problems and our internal domestic questions could not be gone
into because of the relationship between Ireland and Great Britain. Just as in
America during the last Presidential election, it was not the internal affairs
of the country were uppermost; it was other matters. It was the big
international question. That was the misfortune for America at the time, and it
was the great misfortune for Ireland for 120 years, and if the present Pact is
agreed on that will continue. I am against it because it is inconsistent with
our position, because if we are to say the Irish people don't mean it, then they
should have told us that they didn't mean it.
Had the Chairman of the delegation said he did not stand for the things they
had said they stood for, he would not have been elected. The Irish people can
change their minds if they wish to. The Irish people are our masters, and they
can do as they like, but only the Irish people can do that, and we should give
the people the credit that they meant what they said just as we mean what we
say.
I do not think I should continue any further on this matter. I have spoken
generally, and if you wish we can take these documents up, article by article,
but they have been discussed in Private Session, and I do not think there is any
necessity for doing so. Therefore, I am once more asking you to reject the
Treaty for two main reasons, that, as every Teachta knows, it is absolutely
inconsistent with our Position; it gives away Irish independence; it brings us
into the British Empire; it acknowledges the head of the British Empire, not
merely as the head of an association, but as the direct monarch of Ireland, as
the source of executive authority in Ireland. The Ministers of Ireland will be
His Majesty's Ministers, the Army that Commandant MacKeon spoke of will be His
Majesty's Army. [Voices: `No'.] You may sneer at words, but I say
words mean, and I say in a Treaty words do mean something, else why should they
be put down? They have meanings and they have facts, great realities that you
cannot close your eyes to. This Treaty means that the Ministers of the Irish
Free State will be His Majesty's Ministers [cries of `No, no,']
and the Irish Forces will be His Majesty's Forces [`No, no'.]
Well, time will tell, and I hope it won't have a chance, because you will throw
this out. If you accept it, time will tell; it cannot be one way in this
assembly and another way in the British House of Commons. The Treaty is an
agreed document, and there ought to be pretty fairly common interpretation
of it. If there are differences of interpretation we know who will get the best
of them.
I hold, and I don't mind my words being on record, that the chief executive
authority in Ireland is the British Monarch---the British authority. It is in
virtue of that authority the Irish Ministers will function. It is to the
Commander-in-Chief of the Irish Army, who will be the English Monarch, they will
swear allegiance, these soldiers of Ireland. It is on these grounds as being
inconsistent with our position, and with the whole national tradition for 750
years, that it cannot bring peace. Do you think that because you sign documents
like this you can change the current of tradition? You cannot. Some of you are
relying on that cannot to sign this Treaty. But don't put a barrier in
the way of future generations.
Parnell was asked to do something like this---to say it was a final
settlement. But he said, `No man has a right to set...'. No man can is a
different thing. `No man has a right'---take the context and you know the
meaning. Parnell said practically, `You have no right to ask me, because I have
no right to say that any man can
set boundaries to the march of a nation'. As
far as you can, if you take this you are [cries of `No' and `Yes']
presuming to set bounds to the onward march of a nation [applause].
MR. AUSTIN STACK (MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS):
It happens to be my privilege to rise immediately after the President to
support his motion that this House do not approve of the document which has been
presented to them. I shall be very brief; I shall confine myself to what I
regard as the chief defects in the document, namely, those which conflict with
my idea of Irish Independence. I regard clauses in this agreement as being the
governing clauses. These are Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 4. In No. 1 England purports to
bestow on Ireland, an ancient nation, the same constitutional status as any of
the British Dominions, and also to bestow her with a Parliament having certain
powers. To look at the second clause, it starts off---`Subject to provisions
hereinafter set out'---and then she tries to limit you to the powers of the
Dominion of Canada. What they may mean I cannot say, beyond this, that the
Canadian Dominion is set up under a very old Act which considerably limits its
powers. No doubt the words `law, practice, and constitutional usage' are here. I
cannot define what these may mean. Other speakers who will come before the
assembly may be able to explain them. I certainly cannot. To let us assume that
this clause gives to this country full Canadian powers, I for one cannot accept
from England full Canadian powers, three-quarter Canadian powers, or half
Canadian powers. I stand for what is Ireland's right, full independence and
nothing short of it. It is easy to understand that countries like Australia, New
Zealand and the others can put up with the Powers which are bestowed on them,
can put up with acknowledgments to the monarch and rule of Great Britain as head
of their State, for have they not all sprung from England? Are they not children
of England? Have they not been built up by Great Britain? Have they not been
protected by England and lived under England's flag for all time? What other
feeling can they have but affection for England, which they always regarded as
their motherland? This country, on the other hand, has not been a child of
England's, nor never was. England came here as an invader, and for 750 years we
have been resisting that conquest. Are we now after those 750 years to bend the
knee and acknowledge that we received from England as a concession full, or
half, or three-quarter Dominion powers? I say no. Clause 3 of this Treaty gives
us a representative of the Crown in Ireland appointed in the same manner as a
Governor-General. That Governor-General will act in all respects in the name of
the King of England. He will represent the King in the Capital of Ireland and he
will open the Parliament which some members of this House seem to be willing to
attend. I am sure none of them, indeed, is very anxious to attend it under the
circumstances, but if they accept this Treaty they will have to attend
Parliament summoned in the name of the King of Great Britain and Ireland. There
is no doubt about that whatever. The fourth paragraph sets out the form of oath,
and this form of oath may be divided into two parts. In the first part you swear
`true faith and allegiance to the Constitution of the Irish Free State as by law
established'. As the President has stated, according to the Constitution which
will be sanctioned under that Parliament, it will be summoned by the
representative of the King of England and Ireland and will acknowledge that
King. I say even that part of the oath is nothing short of swearing allegiance
to the head of that Constitution which will be the King. You express it again
when you swear, `and that I will be faithful to His Majesty King George V., his
heirs and successors by law'. That is clear enough, and I have no hesitation
whatever in reading the qualifying words. I say these qualifying words in no way
alter the text, or form, or effect of this oath, because what you do in that is
to explain the reason why you give faith, why you pledge fealty to King George.
You say it is in virtue of the common citizenship of Ireland with Great Britain
and the meaning of that is that you are British subjects. You are British
subjects without a doubt, and I challenge anyone here to stand and prove
otherwise than that according to this document. If ever you want to travel
abroad, to a country where a Passport is necessary, your passport must be issued
from the British Foreign Office and you must be described as a British subject
on it [`No, no'.] All right. If you are mean enough to accept this
Treaty, time will tell. You wind up by saying that you further acknowledge that
King in virtue of Ireland's adherence to and membership of the group of nations
known as the British Commonwealth of Nations, and all that, of course, is really
consistent with the whole thing. You will become a member of the British Empire.
Now this question of the oath has an extraordinary significance for me, for, so
far as I can trace, no member of my family has ever taken an oath of allegiance
to England's King. When I say that I do not pretend for a moment that men who
happened to be descended from, or to be sons of men who took oaths of allegiance
to England's Kings, or men who themselves took oaths of allegiance to England's
Kings are any worse for it. There are men in this assembly who have been
comrades of mine in various places, who have been fighting the same fight as I
have been fighting, the same fight which we have all been fighting, and which I
sincerely hope we will be fighting together again ere long. There are men with
whom I was associated in this fight whose fathers had worn England's uniform and
taken oaths of allegiance, and these men were as good men and took their places
as well in the fight for Irish independence as any man I ever met. But what I
wish to say is this: I was nurtured in the traditions of Fenianism. My father
wore England's uniform as a comrade of Charles Kickham and O'Donovan Rossa when
as a '67 man he was sentenced to ten years for being a rebel, but he wore it
minus the oath of allegiance. If I, as I hope I will, try to continue to fight
for Ireland's liberty, even if this rotten document be accepted, I will fight
minus the oath of allegiance and to wipe out the oath of allegiance if I can do
it. Now I ask you has any man here the idea in his head, has any man here the
hardihood to stand up and say that it was for this our fathers have suffered,
that it was for this our comrades have died on the field and in the barrack
yard. If you really believe in your hearts that it was vote for it. If you don't
believe it in your hearts vote against it. It is for you now to make up your
minds. To-day or to-morrow will be, I think, the most fateful days in Irish
history. I will conclude by quoting two of Russell Lowell's lines:
- Once to every man and nation comes a moment to decide,
In the strife 'twixt truth and falsehood for the good or evil side.
Applause
COUNT PLUNKETT (LEITRIM AND NORTH ROSCOMMON):
A Chinn Chomhairle, I rise to support the President in his motion to
reject the resolution put forward by Mr. Arthur Griffith. I have the greatest
personal respect and a recognition of the personal honour of those who went to
London in the hope, in the expectation, I presume, that they would bring back a
settlement that could be agreed to by the Irish people and ratified by them, and
that would be satisfactory to the conscience of Irishmen. But I am sorry to say
that Mr. Arthur Griffith, while he has kept the word of promise to the ear, has
broken it to the cup. I am in favour of the rejection of this Treaty on the
ground that it is not reconcilable with the conscience of the Irish people. I am
in favour of its rejection because I myself in conscience could not stand by it.
It proposes that all the schemes that have been brought up across our track
during our fight for liberty should be substituted for the plain intention of
the Irish people in inaugurating and carrying to a great point of success the
struggle for Irish liberty.
The scheme put forward by Sir Horace Plunkett and Captain Henry Harrison was
scornfully laughed at, because it was common knowledge that these gentlemen
could not deliver the goods. Accordingly Captain Harrison dissolved the Dominion
League. The schemes put forward at the Convention called by the English
Government were rejected with scorn, for no broad-minded Irishman would enter
that assembly. It was a manufactured assembly and did not express the views of
the Irish people; but to-day by a side-wind you are told that the only thing for
you to do is to accept these rejected things.
You were told that your national liberties will be secured by handing them
over to the authority of the British Government. You are told that the vile
thing that was rejected, not only by our generation but by past generations of
fighting men, that this scheme by which we will be put under the authority of
the Imperial Government, swearing an oath of allegiance to the English King,
that this is the means by which you will achieve your liberty. If you were to
achieve it by this means it would mean by treachery among our own, it would mean
that we are to be false either to one oath or the other, and if I take an oath
and devote myself to the fight for national liberty I am not going, whatever the
threat of war or any other device, to abandon the cause to which I have devoted
my life. I am faithful to my oath. I am faithful to the dead. I am faithful to
my own boys, one of whom died for Ireland with his back to the wall and the
other two who were sentenced to death. And I saw them afterwards wearing what
has been described as the livery of England during the beginning of a sentence
of ten years, penal servitude. Am I to go back now on the ingenious suggestion
that by some unexpected contrivance Ireland is to secure her liberty by giving
it away. No, I am no more an enemy of peace than Arthur Griffith. I am no more
an enemy of an understanding, an honest, straight understanding, between England
and Ireland than any man here, but I will never sacrifice the independence of
Ireland simply for the purpose of securing a cessation of warfare. Now look at
what has been already accomplished. The men of 1916 went out and fought the
whole power of the British Empire. Did they lose? They went down, but they went
down as victors. Instead of an irresolute body of people who had handed over
their judgment to a little group of politicians, they were a resolute nation
backing the little forces of Ireland, so that the power of Ireland was not in
the hands of a few hundred men, but in the hands of four-and-a-half millions of
people. That is the position which the men of 1916 secured, and that fight has
been carried on ever since not merely with the countenance of the Irish people,
but with the assistance and backings of the Irish people. To tell me that the
men who allowed their houses to be burned over their heads and still did not
relinquish their nationality, the men whose children were shot before their eyes
and who for the national good had given up all hope of success in this world,
were going to sign a document handing over these liberties to the English
Government in the hope that England in a fit of generosity will not take the
bond as binding. No. As men of honour we must respect our oaths, as men of
principle we must stand by the principle of liberty, and as men whose word is as
good as their bond we must see that no man takes an oath here with the secret
intention of breaking it. We have taken an oath of fidelity to the Republic, and
are we going to take a false oath now to King George? Under no conditions will I
sacrifice my personal honour in such a manner. I don't believe that the men who
foolishly imagine such a thing can be done can resist the corruption that
inevitably comes of dishonour.
MR. JOSEPH MCBRIDE (NORTH AND WEST MAYO):
I am standing in support of the ratification of the Treaty brought home from
London by the plenipotentiaries of Ireland. I support it because I consider it
will be for the best interests of this country. I support the ratification
because I know the people demand its ratification. I support the ratification of
it because I know that the ideals for which I have worked, and for which others
who are listening to me worked through many long and weary years, will be
quicker attained by ratification of this Treaty than otherwise. I have the
honour to know a number of men who suffered and laboured not only in this
generation but in other generations, and I know it would be the last thing that
they should wish that their labours and their sufferings should be used in order
to press an argument in a controversy such as this. Their labours and their
sufferings piled high on their country's altar will be as a beacon to the
generations that are to come. Unity seems to be a fetish with some people in
this assembly. They fear a split. I don't. Probably they have in their minds the
foul implications and the degradation of the Parnell split. But cannot we agree
to differ? I know nothing about the President except what the public know, but I
would be grievously surprised if he carried on any controversy that should arise
out of our differences here in any other than in a dignified and courteous
manner. Arthur Griffith I know for a good number of years. I know how hard he
worked and of his unselfishness. I am aware of his erudition and of his
consistent line in the political movement in Ireland, and I know that he would
not stoop to anything undignified. Who did you send to London?---a bevy of
foolish children without sense of responsibility? Who did you send to London?
Men of honesty and of ability, men of affairs, honourable men. You entrusted
your honour to them and they did not betray it. They went to London with
thorough and complete powers to make a Treaty. They arrived at a Treaty, an
honourable Treaty, and that Treaty I am prepared to vote for, because I know in
voting for its ratification I am serving the best interests of this country and
of my own people.
The House adjourned at 1 o'clock until 3.30 to enable President de
Valera to attend the ceremony of his induction as chancellor of the National
University. On resuming after luncheon, THE SPEAKER took the chair at 3.45 p.m.
MR. MICHAEL COLLINS (MINISTER FOR FINANCE):
A Chinn Chomhairle, much has been said in Private Session about the
action of the plenipotentiaries in signing at all or in signing without first
putting their document before the Cabinet. I want to state as clearly as I can,
and as briefly as I can---I cannot promise you to be very brief---what the exact
position was. It has been fully explained how the Delegation returned from
London on that momentous Saturday to meet the Cabinet at home. We came back with
a document from the British Delegation which we presented to the Cabinet.
Certain things happened at that Cabinet Meeting, and the Delegation, on
returning, put before the British Delegation as well as they could their
impressions of the decisions---I will not say conclusions---arrived at at that
Cabinet Meeting. I do not want unduly to press the word decisions. I want to be
fair to everybody. I can only say they were decisions in this way, that we went
away with certain impressions in our minds and that we did our best faithfully
to transmit these impressions to paper in the memorandum we handed in to the
British Delegation. It was well understood at that Cabinet Meeting that Sir
James Craig was receiving a reply from the British Premier on Tuesday morning.
Some conclusion as between the British Delegation and ourselves had, therefore,
to be come to and handed in to the British Delegation on the Monday night. Now,
we went away with a document which none of us would sign. It must have been
obvious, that being so, that in the meantime a document arose which we thought
we could sign. There was no opportunity of referring it to our people at home.
Actually on the Monday night we did arrive at conclusions which we thought we
could agree to and we had to say `Yes' across the table, and I may say that we
said `Yes'. It was later on that same day that the document was signed. But I do
not now, and I did not then, regard my word as being anything more important, or
a bit less important, than my signature on a document. Now, I also want to make
this clear. The answer which I gave and that signature which I put on that
document would be the same in Dublin or in Berlin, or in New York or in Paris.
If we had been in Dublin the difference in distance would have made this
difference, that we would have been able to consult not only the members of the
Cabinet but many members of the Dáil and many good friends. There has been talk
about `the atmosphere of London' and there has been talk about `slippery
slopes'. Such talk is beside the point. I knew the atmosphere of London of old
and I knew many other things about it of old. If the members knew so much about
`slippery slopes' before we went there why did they not speak then? The slopes
were surely slippery, but it is easy to be wise afterwards. I submit that such
observations are entirely beside the point. And if my signature has been given
in error, I stand by it whether it has or not, and I am not going to take refuge
behind any kind of subterfuge. I stand up over that signature and I give the
same decision at this moment in this assembly [applause]. It has
also been suggested that the Delegation broke down before the first bit of
English bluff. I would remind the Deputy who used that expression that England
put up quite a good bluff for the last five years here and I did not break down
before that bluff [applause, and a voice, `That is the stuff'].
And does anybody think that the respect I compelled from them in a few years was
in any way lowered during two months of negotiations? That also is beside the
point. The results of our labour are before the Dáil. Reject or accept. The
President has suggested that a greater result could have been obtained by more
skillful handling. Perhaps so. But there again the fault is not the
delegation's; it rests with the Dáil. It is not afterwards the Dáil should have
found out our limitations. Surely the Dáil knew it when they selected us, and
our abilities could not have been expected to increase because we were chosen as
plenipotentiaries by the Dáil. The delegates have been blamed for various
things. It is scarcely too much to say that they have been blamed for not
returning with recognition of the Irish Republic. They are blamed, at any rate,
for not having done much better. A Deputy when speaking the other day with
reference to Canada suggested that what may apply with safety to Canada would
not at all apply to Ireland because of the difference in distance from Great
Britain. It seemed to me that he did not regard the delegation as being wholly
without responsibility for the geographical propinquity of Ireland to Great
Britain. It is further suggested that by the result of their labours the
delegation made a resumption of hostilities certain. That again rests with the
Dáil; they should have chosen a better delegation, and it was before we went to
London that should have been done, not when we returned.
Now, Sir, before I come to the Treaty itself, I must say a word on another
vexed question---the question as to whether the terms of reference meant any
departure from the absolutely rigid line of the isolated Irish Republic. Let me
read to you in full (at the risk of wearying you) the two final communications
which passed between Mr. Lloyd George and President de Valera.
From Lloyd George to de Valera. It is a telegram. In that way the word
`President' was not an omission on my part. Gairloch Sept. 29th, 1921
His Majesty's Government have given close and earnest consideration to the
correspondence which has passed between us since their invitation to you to
send delegates to a conference at Inverness. In spite of their sincere desire
for peace, and in spite of the more conciliatory tone of your last
communication, they cannot enter a conference upon the basis of this
correspondence. Notwithstanding your personal assurance to the contrary, which
they much appreciate, it might be argued in future that the acceptance of a
conference on this basis had involved them in a recognition which no British
Government can accord. On this point they must guard themselves against any
possible doubt. There is no purpose to be served by any further interchange of
explanatory and argumentative communications upon this subject. The position
taken up by His Majesty's Government is fundamental to the existence of the
British Empire and they cannot alter it. My colleagues and I remain, however,
keenly anxious to make in cooperation with your delegates another determined
effort to explore every possibility of settlement by personal discussion. The
proposals which we have already made have been taken by the whole world as
proof that our endeavours for reconciliation and settlement are no empty form,
and we feel that conference, not correspondence, is the most practicable and
hopeful way to an understanding such as we ardently desire to achieve. We,
therefore, send you herewith a fresh invitation to a conference in London on
October 11th where we can meet your delegates as spokesmen of
the people whom
you represent with a view to ascertaining how the association of Ireland with
the community of nations known as the British Empire may best be reconciled
with Irish National aspirations.
From de Valera to Lloyd George. 30th Sept., 1921.
We have received your letter of invitation to a Conference in London on
October 11th, with a view to ascertaining
how the association of Ireland with
the community of Nations known as the British Empire may best be reconciled
with Irish National aspirations.
Our respective positions have been stated and are understood, and we agree
that conference, not correspondence, is the most practicable and hopeful way
to an understanding. We accept the invitation, and our delegates will meet you
in London on the date mentioned, to explore every possibility of settlement by
personal discussion.
This question of association was bandied around as far back as August 10th
and went on until the final communication. The communication of September 29th
from Lloyd George made it clear that they were going into a conference not on
the recognition of the Irish Republic, and I say if we all stood on the
recognition of the Irish Republic as a prelude to any conference we could very
easily have said so, and there would be no conference. What I want to make clear
is that it was the acceptance of the invitation that formed the compromise. I
was sent there to form that adaptation, to bear the brunt of it. Now as one of
the signatories of the document I naturally recommend its acceptance. I do not
recommend it for more than it is. Equally I do not recommend it for less than it
is. In my opinion it gives us freedom, not the ultimate freedom that all nations
desire and develop to, but the freedom to achieve it [applause].
A Deputy has stated that the delegation should introduce this Treaty not, he
describes, as bagmen for England, but with an apology for its introduction. I
cannot imagine anything more mean, anything more despicable, anything more
unmanly than this dishonouring of one's signature. Rightly or wrongly when you
make a bargain you cannot alter it, you cannot go back and get sorry for it and
say `I ought to have made a better bargain'. Business cannot be done on those
bases. I must make reference to the signing of the Treaty. This Treaty was
not
signed under personal intimidation. If personal intimidation had been attempted
no member of the delegation would have signed it.
At a fateful moment I was called upon to make a decision, and if I were
called upon at the present moment for a decision on the same question my
decision would be the same. Let there be no mistake and no misunderstanding
about that.
I have used the word `intimidation'. The whole attitude of Britain towards
Ireland in the past was an attitude of intimidation, and we, as negotiators,
were not in the position of conquerors dictating terms of peace to a vanquished
foe. We had not beaten the enemy out of our country by force of arms.
To return to the Treaty, hardly anyone, even those who support it, really
understands it, and it is necessary to explain it, and the immense powers and
liberties it secures. This is my justification for having signed it, and for
recommending it to the nation. Should the Dáil reject it, I am, as I said, no
longer responsible. But I am responsible for making the nation fully understand
what it gains by accepting it, and what is involved in its rejection. So long as
I have made that clear I am perfectly happy and satisfied. Now we must look
facts in the face. For our continued national and spiritual existence two things
are necessary---security and freedom. If the Treaty gives us these or helps us
to get at these, then I maintain that it satisfies our national aspirations. The
history of this nation has not been, as is so often said, the history of a
military struggle of 750 years; it has been much more a history of peaceful
penetration of 750 years. It has not been a struggle for the ideal of freedom
for 750 years symbolised in the name Republic. It has been a story of slow,
steady, economic encroach by England. It has been a struggle on our part to
prevent that, a struggle against exploitation, a struggle against the cancer
that was eating up our lives, and it was only after discovering that, that it
was economic penetration, that we discovered that political freedom was
necessary in order that that should be stopped. Our aspirations, by whatever
term they may be symbolised, had one thing in front all the time, that was to
rid the country of the enemy strength. Now it was not by any form of
communication except through their military strength that the English held this
country. That is simply a plain fact which, I think, nobody will deny. It wasn't
by any forms of government, it wasn't by their judiciary or anything of that
kind. These people could not operate except for the military strength that was
always there. Now, starting from that, I maintain that
the disappearance of that
military strength gives us the chief proof that our national liberties are
established. And as to what has been said about guarantees of the withdrawal of
that military strength, no guarantees, I say, can alter the fact of their
withdrawal. because we are a weaker nation, and we shall be a weaker nation for
a long time to come. But certain things do give us a certain guarantee. We are
defined as having the constitutional status of Canada, Australia, New Zealand,
South Africa. If the English do not withdraw the military strength,
our
association with those places do give us, to some extent, a guarantee that they
must withdraw them. I know that it would be finer to stand alone, but if it is
necessary to our security, if it is necessary to the development of our own
life, and if we find we cannot stand alone, what can we do but enter into some
association? Now I have prepared part of this which I am going to read very
carefully. I have said that I am not a constitutional lawyer. I am going to give
a constitutional opinion in what I am going to read, and I will back that
constitutional opinion against the opinion of any Deputy, lawyer or otherwise,
in this Dáil.
[Reading]: The status as defined is the same constitutional
status in the `community of nations known as the British Empire', as Canada,
Australia, New Zealand, South Africa. And here let me say that in my judgment it
is not a definition of any status that would secure us that status, it is the
power to hold and to make secure and to increase what we have gained. The fact
of Canadian and South African independence is something real and solid, and will
grow in reality and force as time goes on. Judged by that touchstone, the
relations between Ireland and Britain will have a certainty of freedom and
equality which cannot be interfered with. England dare not interfere with
Canada. Any attempt to interfere with us would be even more difficult in
consequence of the reference to the `constitutional status' of Canada and South
Africa.
They are, in effect, introduced as guarantors of our freedom, which makes us
stronger than if we stood alone.
In obtaining the `constitutional status' of Canada, our association with
England is based not on the present technical legal position of Canada. It is an
old Act, the Canadian Act, and the advances in freedom from it have been
considerable. That is the reply to one Deputy who spoke to-day of the real
position, the complete freedom equality with Canada has given us. I refer now
not to the legal technical status, but to the status they have come to, the
status which enables Canada to send an Ambassador to Washington, the status
which enables Canada to sign the Treaty of Versailles equally with Great
Britain, the status which prevents Great Britain from entering into any foreign
alliance without the consent of Canada, the status that gives Canada the right
to be consulted before she may go into any war. It is not the definition of that
status that will give it to us; it is our power to take it and to keep it, and
that is where I differ from the others. I believe in our power to take it and to
keep it. I believe in our future civilisation. As I have said already, as a
plain Irishman, I believe in
my own interpretation against the interpretation of
any Englishman. Lloyd George and Churchill have been quoted here against us. I
say the quotation of those people is what marks the slave mind. There are people
in this assembly who will take their words before they will take my words. That
is the slave mind.
The only departure from the Canadian status is the retaining by England of
the defences of four harbours, and the holding of some other facilities to be
used possibly in time of war. But if England wished to re-invade us she could do
so with or without these facilities. And with the `constitutional status' of
Canada we are assured that these facilities could never be used by
England for
our re-invasion. If there was no association, if we stood alone, the occupation
of the ports might probably be a danger to us. Associated in a free partnership
with these other nations it is not a danger, for their association is a
guarantee that it won't be used as a jumping-off ground against us. And that
same person tells me that we haven't Dominion status because of the occupation
of these ports, but that South Africa had even when Simonstown was occupied. I
cannot accept that argument. I am not an apologist for this Treaty. We have got
rid of the word Empire . For the first time in an official document the
former Empire is styled `The Community of Nations known as the British Empire'.
Common citizenship has been mentioned. Common citizenship is the substitution
for the subjection of Ireland. It is an admission by them that they no longer
can dominate Ireland. As I have said, the English penetration has not merely
been a military penetration. At the present moment the
economic penetration goes
on. I need only give you a few instances. Every day our Banks become
incorporated or allied to British interests, every day our Steamship Companies
go into English hands, every day some other business concern in this city is
taken over by an English concern and becomes a little oasis of English customs
and manners. Nobody notices, but that is the thing that has destroyed our Gaelic civilisation. That is a thing that we are able to stop, not perhaps if we lose
the opportunity of stopping it now. That is one of the things that I consider is
important, and to the nation's life perhaps more important than the military
penetration. And this gives us the opportunity of stopping it. Indeed when we
think of the thing from that economic point of view it would be easy to go on
with the physical struggle in comparison with it.
Do we think at all of what it means to look forward to the directing of the
organisation of the nation? Is it one of the things we are prepared to
undertake? If we came back with the recognition of the Irish Republic we would
need to start somewhere. Are we simply going to go on keeping ourselves in
slavery and subjection, for ever keeping on an impossible fight? Are we never
going to stand on our own feet? Now I had an argument based on a comparison of
the Treaty with the second document, and part of the argument was to read the
clauses of the second document. In deference to what the President has said I
shall not at this stage make use of that argument. I don't want to take anything
that would look like an unfair advantage. I am not standing for this thing to
get advantage over anybody, and whatever else the President will say about me, I
think he will admit that.
PRESIDENT DE VALERA:
I never said anything but the highest.
MR. MICHAEL COLLINS (MINISTER FOR FINANCE):
Now I have explained something as to what the Treaty is. I also want to
explain to you as one of the signatories what I consider rejection of it means.
It has been said that the alternative document does not mean war. Perhaps it
does, perhaps it does not. That is not the first part of the argument. I say
that rejection of the Treaty is a declaration of war until you have beaten the
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